Durham Condominium Corporation No. 136 v. Crowther
2023 ONCAT 159 · October 30, 2023 · Notice upheld
ONCAT enforced a pet-removal order against a unit owner whose dog (Nico) exceeded the corporation's weight restriction and had been the subject of multiple nuisance complaints. Member Wickett held that the respondent had breached the corporation's rule 23(a) by keeping a large dog despite the weight restriction, and that the corporation's decision to deem Nico a nuisance and require removal was reasonable. The case is instructive for owners considering Human Rights Code accommodation defences: where the respondent barely participated, did not acknowledge complaints, and offered no substantive defence to the allegations, the tribunal will treat the corporation's evidence as essentially unchallenged.
Why this matters for Alberta owners
TL;DR: If you're going to defend a pet-removal order based on accommodation or any other ground, you have to actually participate in the hearing — and you have to engage substantively with the complaints, not just disagree generally. Member Wickett in DCC 136 v. Crowther upheld a pet-removal order largely because the respondent 'barely participated' in the hearing and never substantively engaged with the corporation's evidence about the dog's nuisance behaviour. The case is the structural counterpoint to Baha (2024 ONCAT 131 — see /tribunal-decisions/2024-oncat-131), where unrebutted medical evidence supported a successful accommodation claim. The Alberta translation: silence at the CDRT means the corporation's record stands. Engaging in good faith with the substantive issues — even if you ultimately disagree — preserves your defences.
The facts. Durham Condominium Corporation No. 136 had two pet rules at issue. Rule 23(a) imposed a weight restriction on pets. Rule 23(c) required pet registration. Rule 23(g) provided that if the board deemed a pet to be a nuisance, the owner was required to remove the pet within 14 days of written notice. Mr. Crowther kept a dog named Nico that exceeded the weight restriction. After complaints about Nico's behaviour on common elements — including alleged urination — the corporation issued compliance demands, then escalated to the tribunal. By the time of the hearing, Mr. Crowther had registered Nico (so the 23(c) breach was cured) but Nico still exceeded the weight limit (23(a) breach continued) and the corporation had deemed Nico a nuisance under 23(g).
What the tribunal held. The substantive findings were direct. At paragraph 26: "the Respondents have and continue to breach DCC 136's rule 23 (a) because Nico is a large dog who lives in their unit and exceeds the weight restriction set out in this rule." The 23(c) breach was already cured. The 23(g) nuisance-removal order was the central issue — and this is where the respondent's lack of participation was decisive.
Notice the structural problem. Mr. Crowther could not be reached through silence. He didn't agree with the complaints (which would have foreclosed his defence on the merits), but he also didn't deny them (which would have created a factual issue for the tribunal to weigh). He simply didn't engage. The tribunal had no choice but to proceed on the corporation's evidence, which was credible enough on its face to support both the breach finding and the reasonableness of the nuisance determination.
The accommodation framing. The case has been positioned in some commentary as a Human Rights Code accommodation case, but the actual decision text shows the accommodation argument never properly took shape. There's no extended analysis of medical evidence, no examination of accommodation requirements, no testing of whether the dog provided a service or emotional-support function. The reason: Mr. Crowther didn't put that evidence in. Where Baha succeeded by submitting properly authenticated medical evidence from his treating physician, Crowther failed by submitting nothing of the kind.
The Baha contrast — what proper participation looks like. Compare to our commentary at /tribunal-decisions/2024-oncat-131 (Baha). Reza Baha defended successfully against a board-rotation-style enforcement by participating fully, submitting medical evidence, and engaging point-by-point with the corporation's framing. His accommodation succeeded. Crowther defended unsuccessfully by absenting himself from the substantive engagement. The difference between the outcomes was not the doctrine — both cases involved analogous protective frameworks — but the level of substantive engagement.
Why this matters in Alberta. The CDRT's procedure tracks the ONCAT pattern: written-hearing submissions, document-driven evidence, response windows that close. The Crowther structural failure is one of the most common ways owners lose CDRT applications they should have been able to defend: not because the law was against them, but because they didn't put their evidence in. Alberta corporations rely heavily on the same evidentiary pattern as Ontario corporations — incident reports, complaint logs, manager testimony, prior-warning records. Where an owner doesn't respond with their own evidence, the corporation's record becomes the de facto truth.
The bottom line: tribunals decide cases on the evidence in front of them. Where the owner barely participates, the corporation's evidence becomes the record. Member Wickett's Crowther decision is the structural cautionary tale for owners considering whether to engage with a CDRT proceeding — engagement is mandatory for substantive defences, including accommodation. Run FineCheck on the notice; document your engagement at every step; submit your evidence.
What the tribunal said
Selected excerpts from the Ontario CAT's reasoning. Full decision on CanLII.
[25] Further, at no time, including during this hearing, has Mr. Crowther acknowledged the complaints about Nico, nor has he denied the allegations that Nico has been allowed to urinate on the common elements. [26] In considering the evidence before me, I find the Respondents are no longer in breach of DCC 136's rule 23 (c) because they registered Nico once demanded to do so. However, I do find that the Respondents have and continue to breach DCC 136's rule 23 (a) because Nico is a large dog who lives in their unit and exceeds the weight restriction set out in this rule. [28] The only evidence before me to consider in making my finding about the reasonableness of DCC 136's decisions is that of DCC 136. I say this because the Respondents barely participated in the hearing and provided limited evidence. The Respondents did not challenge DCC 136's claim that Nico is a nuisance, and they offered no defence to the allegations made against them. [29] DCC 136's rule 23 (g) further states that if the board of directors deems a pet to be a nuisance, 'the owner of that pet shall, within fourteen (14) days after receiving a written request from the Board or the manager, remove such pet permanently from the property'.
Connects to FineCheck's framework
Jurisdictional note: Ontario CATdecisions are not binding on Alberta's CDRT, but the CDRT will look to other Canadian condo tribunals for guidance under analogous statutory provisions until its own case law develops. The substantial-compliance + prejudice framework used in this decision parallels the test in CDRT Policies and Procedures s.7(b).
Decision date: October 30, 2023 · Citation: 2023 ONCAT 159 · Outcome: notice upheld. FineCheck's commentary is published for research and educational use; not legal advice. Verify any reliance on this decision against the original text.